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ABSTRACT: This article illustrates ways in which the concepts of the norm and 
normativity are implicated in relations of power.  Specifically, I argue that these 
concepts have come to function in a normalizing manner.  I outline Michel Fou-
cault’s thinking on the norm and normalization and then provide an overview of 
Jürgen Habermas’s thinking on the norm and normativity in order to show that 
Habermas’s conceptualizations of the norm and normativity are not, as he posits, 
necessary foundations for ethics and politics, but in fact simply one philosophical 
approach among many.  Uncritically accepting a Habermasian framework therefore 
produces normalizing effects and inhibits alternative and potentially emancipatory 
thinking about ethics and politics.  Having problematized the requirement of norma-
tive foundations as it is currently articulated, I conclude by examining the emanci-
patory potential of a particular aspect of Foucault’s work for the practice of philo-
sophy.   
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I believe that one of the meanings of human existence – the source of human 
freedom – is never to accept anything as definitive, untouchable, obvious, or 
immobile.  No aspect of reality should be allowed to become a definitive and 
inhuman law for us.1  ~ Michel Foucault 
 
I recently presented a conference paper in which I argued that Foucault’s 
conceptualizations of the norm and normalization are relevant for contemporary 
feminism.  I justified my claim in part by asserting that Foucault’s elucidation of the 
power effects and contingency of particular social norms (such as sex and gender), 
                                                 
1  Michel Foucault, ‚Power, Moral Values, and the Intellectual.‛ Interview with Michael  
Bess (November 3, 1980), IMEC (Institut Mémoirs de l’Édition Contemporaine) Archive 
folder number FCL2. A02-06. 
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extends to the idea of the norm itself.  For Foucault, the norm is a norm.  But it is one 
of those norms (e.g., sex and gender) that effectively presents itself not as a norm, 
but as a given and therefore outside of power – benign and closed to critical analysis.  
Just as he does with the idea of sex in Volume I of The History of Sexuality, Foucault 
traces across several of his Collège de France courses the emergence of the idea of 
the norm as a modern concept and illustrates its implication in modern relations of 
power.  In my paper, I argued that this tracing and illustrating is important because 
it effectively supports Foucault’s contention that nothing, even (for Foucault, 
especially) those concepts, categories, and principles that appear to be most 
fundamental to making sense of the world, need simply be accepted, and that such 
refusal creates possibilities for developing alternative modes of thought and 
existence which increase persons’ capacities and expand their possibilities without 
simultaneously increasing and expanding the proliferation of power within society.  
Refusing to simply accept what is presented as natural, necessary, and normal – like 
the ideas of sex and the norm itself – presents possibilities for engaging in and 
expanding the practice of freedom. 
During the question and answer period, a conference participant asserted 
that Foucault’s work could possess only minimal relevance for feminism.  ‚It’s not 
normative,‛ the individual stated flatly, while several people sitting nearby nodded 
their heads in agreement.  Neither the questioner nor the tacit supporters elaborated; 
indeed, the assumption appeared to be that no elaboration was needed: to contend 
that Foucault’s work was lacking in normative content simply spoke for itself.  The 
burden was therefore on me, for if Foucault’s work was not in fact normative there 
was no way it could possess relevance for feminist thought and practice.   
In this essay, I present the long version of my response to persons such as the 
conference participants described above.  My focus here is not the relevance of 
Foucault’s work for feminism, but rather the more fundamental claim that his work 
is ‚not normative.‛  In making that assertion, it seemed to me at the time (and still 
does) that the conference participants missed the point of my paper.  From their 
perspective, one may critically analyze things like what it means to say a practice is 
normative, how particular norms or normative practices function, and whether a 
particular norm is oppressive, but the necessity of the norm and normativity for any 
discussion of ethics and politics, let alone for articulating emancipatory ethical and 
political theory and practice, must be accepted; indeed, it is simply assumed.  My 
point, by contrast, was that assuming and uncritically accepting, as my questioner 
did, the necessity of a concept not only for promoting freedom, but also and more 
fundamentally for making sense at all, is itself normalizing and that, moreover, part 
of the way normalizing norms work is by masking their own effects of power and 
thus inhibiting the kind of critical analysis that would have allowed the questioner 
to perceive the uncritical assumptions she was making. 
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  A norm is normalizing if, as noted above, it links the increase of capacities 
and expansion of possibilities to an increase in and expansion of the proliferation of 
power within society.  Simply put, normalizing norms encourage subjects to become 
highly efficient at performing a narrowly defined range of practices.  This is the case 
with gender, where subjects are divided into two mutually exclusive groups, the 
appropriate behaviors of which are predetermined and which these subjects are 
encouraged to repeat over and over again.  In time, the repeated behaviors become 
embedded to the point where they are perceived not as a particular set of prevailing 
norms, but instead simply as ‚normal,‛ inevitable, and therefore immune to critical 
analysis.  Normalizing norms thus hinder not only critical analysis itself but also, to 
the extent that they become naturalized, the recognition that such engagement is 
needed or possible at all.  So, for example, while the specific character of acceptable 
gender roles may change over time, the idea persists that women and men are 
different in some fundamental ways that simply must be accepted.  To the extent 
that normalizing norms maintain or strengthen the link between increased capacities 
and expanded possibilities and increased power and inhibit or even prevent the 
cultivation and exercise of practices which elucidate and loosen this link, these 
norms are counter to freedom.   
The response my conference paper generated suggests to me that the 
concepts of the norm and normativity have come to play a normalizing role within 
philosophical discourse, particularly with respect to ethics and politics.  While I 
believe that a broad analysis of the normalizing effects of the norm and normativity 
is called for, in this essay I limit myself to analyzing these normalizing effects 
relative to the work of Foucault, for if Foucault’s insight into the normalizing effects 
of the idea of the norm, let alone the broader ethico-political relevance of his work, is 
to be taken seriously the characterization of his work as ‚not normative‛ must be 
addressed.  In order to address this issue, I contrast Foucault’s conceptualization of 
the nature and function of the norm with that of Jürgen Habermas.  Habermas’s 
work is paradigmatic of the view that ethics and politics generally and emancipatory 
ethics and politics more specifically can be meaningfully articulated only if they are 
grounded in certain normative principles.  Analyzing his work in relation to Fou-
cault’s therefore provides an effective means through which to illustrate how the 
demand for normative criteria has come to function as a kind of normative criterion, 
to illustrate the contingency of this norm, and to analyze its normalizing effects.  
Exposing the demand for normative criteria as both contingent and normalizing, I 
argue, facilitates measured analysis and therefore better understanding of work such 
as Foucault’s which, under prevailing conceptions of the norm and normativity, is 
seen as possessing limited ethical and political relevance or at worst as ethically and 
politically harmful.  Once the demand that Foucault’s work satisfy prevailing ideas 
about the norm and normativity is lifted, his refusal to comply with, as well as his 
criticism of, that demand no longer renders his work ethically and politically 
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irrelevant or dangerous; instead, its value in promoting practices of freedom can be 
explored.   
I want to be clear that while my argument reflects a Foucauldian perspective, 
I do not mean to reject Habermas’s work or pit the work of Foucault against that of 
Habermas; nor will I attempt to show that the work of these two thinkers is in fact 
compatible.2  Indeed, I believe these kinds of strategies assume and therefore 
perpetuate the very ways of thinking about the norm and normativity that I seek to 
call into question.  I do want to make a point about how the uncritical acceptance of 
Habermasian notions of the norm and normativity necessarily posits Foucault’s 
work as non-normative and therefore ethically and politically irrelevant or harmful.  
Yet my broader aim is to show that it is only through critical interrogation of what 
has been presupposed or uncritically accepted that the emancipatory potential of 
any philosophy – whether work such as Habermas’s which asserts the necessity of 
normative foundations for ethics and politics, or such as Foucault’s, which seeks to 
elucidate the power effects of such assertions – can be effectively explored.  My 
question in this essay, and the direction in which I see Foucault’s work pointing, is 
therefore not, ‚Is it normative?‛ but rather ‘What motivates the question, ‚Is it 
normative?‛ and what are the effects of this question?’  Simply put, my question is 
not ‚Is it normative?‛ but ‚Is it normalizing?‛ 
I proceed by outlining relevant aspects of Foucault’s thinking on the norm 
and normalization across several of his Collège de France courses,3 and then 
providing an overview of Habermas’s thinking on the norm and normativity.  I next 
                                                 
2  A good deal of scholarly analysis has been generated that addresses the problem of the   
norm and normativity in the work of Foucault and Habermas.  The problem figures 
centrally in two edited volumes, Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas 
Debate, ed. Michael Kelly (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1994) and Foucault Contra Habermas, eds. 
Samantha Ashenden and David Owen (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999), and is also 
apparent in a number of the essays (including Habermas’s own) in Foucault: A Critical 
Reader, ed. David Couzens Hoy (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1986).  All of these volumes 
contain essays that make valuable contributions to Foucault and Habermas scholarship, 
and some of them (such as James Tulley’s contribution to the Ashenden/Owen volume, 
which I cite later in this essay) move in the direction of my own analysis.  But I think the 
majority of the contributions ultimately accept prevailing notions of the norm and 
normativity and, hence, end up covering the same ground concerning whether 
Foucault’s work is normative or not. 
3  Foucault addresses the problematic nature and function of norms in his published work,  
Discipline and Punish and Volume I of The History of Sexuality being particularly important 
in this regard insofar as these texts illustrate the workings of disciplinary power and 
biopower, respectively.  I have chosen to focus on the Collège de France courses because 
within their context one can clearly see Foucault formulating his ideas as he works 
though various problems. The courses thus provide valuable insight into the 
development of Foucault’s thought across time which is not as apparent within the 
context of his published works. 
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show that Habermas’s conceptualizations of the norm and normativity are not, as he 
posits, necessary foundations for ethics and politics, but in fact simply one 
philosophical approach among many.  On the one hand, then, uncritically accepting 
a Habermasian framework produces normalizing effects; on the other hand, ways of 
thinking about, conceptualizing, and practicing ethics and politics that do not 
require a particular understanding of ‚normative foundations‛ and which could in 
fact possess emancipatory potential are possible.  Having problematized the 
requirement of normative foundations as it is currently articulated, I conclude by 
examining the emancipatory potential of a particular aspect of Foucault’s work for 
the practice of philosophy. 
Foucault’s conceptualizations of the nature and function of the norm and 
normalization can be traced through four of his Collège de France courses: 
Psychiatric Power (1974); Abnormal (1975); Society Must be Defended (1976); and 
Security, Territory, Population (1978).  In these courses, Foucault associates the norm 
with specifically modern forms of power.  He argues that with the rise of modernity, 
sovereign power found itself unable to effectively control all aspects of increasingly 
complex societies, with the result that certain techniques of power which had up 
until that point had been employed only within religious contexts were generalized 
to society more broadly.4  Foucault sees the norm as being at the heart of these 
techniques of modern power. 
In his 1974 and 1975 courses, Foucault ties the norm to disciplinary power, 
which targets individual bodies in order to train subjects that are simultaneously 
efficient and obedient.  In Psychiatric Power, Foucault argues that within a 
disciplinary context, the norm functions ‚as the universal prescription for all‛ 
disciplinary subjects.5  The following year, in Abnormal, Foucault identifies the norm 
as the ‚element‛ upon which ‚a certain exercise of power is founded and 
legitimized.‛6  He also elaborates on precisely how the norm functions within a 
disciplinary context, arguing that the norm ‚brings with it a principle of both 
qualification and correction.  The norm’s function is not to exclude and reject.  
Rather, it is always linked to a positive technique of intervention and transfor-
mation, to a sort of normative project.‛7  Under disciplinary power, Foucault writes, 
‚there is an originally prescriptive character of the norm,‛ in the sense that the norm 
                                                 
4  ‚Far too many things,‛ Foucault states, ‚were escaping the old mechanism of the power  
of sovereignty, both at the top and at the bottom, both at the level of detail and at the 
mass level.‛  See Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de 
France 1975-76, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 249. 
5  Michel Foucault, Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège de France 1973-1974, trans.  
Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 55. 
6  Michel Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France 1974-1975, trans. Graham  
Burchell (New York: Picador, 2003), 50. 
7  Ibid. 
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determines what is normal.8  Subjects constitute themselves and are in turn 
constituted through techniques of power that presuppose the norm, construed as an 
ideal or ‚optimal model.‛9   
 As a result of his evolving conception of the nature and function of modern 
power, Foucault modifies his conception of the norm in the 1976 course.  Power does 
not only target individual bodies, Foucault has come to realize in Society Must Be 
Defended, it also targets populations by way of a second form of modern power 
which he refers to as biopower.  Generally speaking, biopower proliferates through 
the actions of the State in such a way as to regulate populations at the biological 
level in the name of promoting the health and protecting the life of society as a 
whole.  This protection and regulation intersects with the disciplining of individual 
bodies within the context of modern societies, Foucault argues, and the norm is the 
mechanism along which this intersection occurs.  It circulates between the disci-
plinary and the regulatory; it is ‚something that can be applied to both a body one 
wishes to discipline and a population one wishes to regularize.‛10  While the norm 
still founds and legitimizes power, it does so specifically by linking disciplinary and 
biopower and thus facilitating the flow of power through and across all facets of 
modern societies. 
 Foucault returned to the Collège in 197811 having further modified his 
conception of the norm.  The norm can still be said to found and legitimize modern 
power by providing a link between disciplinary power and biopower, but in 
Security, Territory, Population he argues that it functions differently within 
disciplinary and biopolitical contexts.  With discipline, the norm establishes the 
normal: individuals are brought and bring themselves into conformity with some 
pre-existing standard.  With biopower, the norm is established from several 
‚normals,‛ as represented specifically by ‚curves of normality;‛ statistical analysis, 
according to Foucault, constitutes a key technique for regulating and managing 
populations.  From these normals, the ‚most normal‛ or the ‚optimal normal‛ – i.e., 
the norm – for a particular population is established: within a biopolitical context 
‚the norm is an interplay of differential normalities . . . the normal comes first, and 
the norm is deduced from it.‛12  As Foucault describes it, different normal curves are 
produced by studying a population, from those normal curves the norm gets 
established as an optimal or ideal normal which is then brought back to bear on the 
population in order to regulate that population – that is, to dictate how the 
                                                 
8  Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977- 
1978, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 57. 
9  Ibid. 
10  Ibid., 252-253. 
11  The 1976 course ended in March of 1976; the 1978 course did not commence until January  
of 1978. 
12  Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 63. 
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population ought to behave.  Since populations are not fully engaged in relations of 
power until this prescriptive function is implemented, the foundation and 
legitimation of biopower still hinges on the norm in important ways. 
The idea that the norm functions differently within disciplinary and 
biopolitical contexts leads Foucault to in turn mark a distinction between the 
techniques of power to which the norm gives rise in these respective contexts.  Prior 
to the 1978 course, Foucault has referred to all power techniques originating with the 
norm as ‚normalization.‛  In the 1974 course, Foucault specifically describes the 
function of disciplinary power in these terms.  Within a disciplinary context, he 
argues, ‚uninterrupted supervision, continual writing, and potential punishment 
enframed [the] subjected body and extracted a psyche from it . . . [the] individual is a 
subjected body held in a system of supervision and subjected to procedures of 
normalization.‛13  In the 1975 course, Foucault again speaks of normalization as 
consisting of techniques he associates with disciplinary power.  He describes these 
techniques as ‚simultaneously positive, technical, and political,‛ and argues that 
they function in the service of bringing subjects into conformity with a pre-
determined norm.14   
At the beginning of the 1976 course, Foucault invokes the idea of 
normalization primarily in order to distinguish it (and therefore disciplinary power) 
from juridical or sovereign power.  ‚The discourse of disciplines,‛ he asserts, ‚is 
about a rule: not a juridical rule derived from sovereignty, but a discourse about a 
natural rule, or in other words a norm.  Disciplines will define not a code of law but 
a code of normalization.‛15  By the end of that course Foucault has ceased to use the 
term ‚normalization‛ altogether and speaks only of ‚normalizing societies‛ 
(societies characterized by the linking together of disciplinary power and biopower).   
Given that at this point Foucault was rethinking the norm’s role within 
modern relations of power, it seems likely that he was beginning to rethink the 
nature of normalization as well.  Indeed, by 1978 Foucault has marked a distinction 
between normalization, which he now attributes solely to biopower and describes as 
the process of establishing the norm from different normal curves, and the 
disciplinary process of bringing subjects into conformity with a pre-determined 
norm which he now refers to as ‚normation.‛16  This distinction between norma-
lization and normation should not be seen as an indication that Foucault is no longer 
concerned with disciplinary power and its ‚normizing‛ techniques.  As the rest of 
the 1978 course, as well as others of Foucault’s texts,17 makes clear, he continues to 
                                                 
13  Foucault, Psychiatric Power, 56-57. 
14  Foucault, Abnormal, 50. 
15  Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 38. 
16  Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 63.   
17   See Michel Foucault, ‚Governmentality,‛ in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality,  
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view modern societies as being characterized by both disciplinary and biopower – 
and although it is less prominent and not characteristically modern, by sovereign 
power as well.  Insofar as Foucault explicitly argues that when they emerge, new 
forms of power do not entirely displace existing forms, the norm retains its function 
of linking the discipline of bodies and the regulation of populations of linking 
normation and normalization.   Likewise, the norm retains its function of founding 
and legitimizing modern power, despite the fact that in normalization the norm is 
derived from the normal.   
In sum: Foucault posits the norm as playing a fundamental role in the 
emergence, legitimation, proliferation, and circulation of modern power.  The norm 
establishes what is normal.  Techniques of normation and normalization in turn 
function to ‚make normal.‛  On the one hand, they intervene within both individual 
bodies and populations in order to bring them into conformity with particular social 
norms.  On the other hand, in doing so such techniques perpetuate the power 
relations that the norm founds and legitimizes by reproducing norms within the 
sociopolitical landscape to the point that they come to be seen not as produced at all 
but simply as natural and necessary.  Within a disciplinary context the norm gets 
established by, for example, factory managers who determine that workers should 
be able to produce a product in a certain amount of time.  The workers’ bodies are 
trained so that they become highly effective at performing the particular operation 
that will facilitate the desired outcome.  Within the context of biopower the norm 
gets established by, for example, economists who deem a certain level of unemploy-
ment or poverty acceptable or even necessary within the overall population in order 
for the economy to grow.  These ‚normal‛ levels of unemployment or poverty are 
cultivated within the population as a whole.18   
It is important to bear in mind that not all individual social norms are 
normizing/normalizing.  From a Foucauldian perspective, social norms act as ‚nodal 
points‛ within a broad power matrix.  Power passes through and along norms, and 
these points of intersection can either facilitate or inhibit the further circulation of 
power.  Norms that facilitate power’s circulation don’t pose a problem.  Given that 
he conceives of power in terms of relations, Foucault considers subjects to be free 
when they are able to modify, negotiate, and/or reverse these relations – when in 
                                                                                                                                                 
eds. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991). 
18  Foucault shows that institutions – prisons, schools, factories, the military – play a key  
role in the establishment and proliferation of norms and, hence, in the proliferation of 
modern power.  I am grateful to the editors of this journal for pointing out to me that 
Foucault believed developing new, non-normalizing/normizing institutions was an 
‚important and crucial issue,‛ at the same time that he admitted he had ‚no precise idea‛ 
of how such development would occur.  See Michel Foucault, ‚Sex, Power and the 
Politics of Identity,‛ in Foucault Live: Collected Interviews, 1961-1984, ed. Sylvère Lotringer 
(New York: Semiotexte, 1989), 389. 
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other words, the circulation of power within society is at least relatively unimpeded.  
It is therefore the sedimentation of power through the uncritical acceptance of 
particular norms as natural and therefore necessary that is cause for concern.  
Normalizing norms are those which facilitate such sedimentation by linking the 
increase of capacities and expansion of possibilities to an intensification of existing 
power relations.  One way in which sedimentation occurs, taking the example given 
above, is through certain conceptions of worker productivity or certain 
understandings and levels of poverty and unemployment coming to be seen as 
natural.  Over time persons not only don’t think critically about these phenomena, 
they don’t give them much thought at all;  worker productivity, poverty, and 
unemployment simply become part of the landscape – what has to be assumed in 
order for discussions about the economy to be entered into.  Such naturalization 
effectively promotes acceptance and conformity with prevailing norms on both an 
individual and societal level.  Moreover, the norm provides the grounds not only for 
distinguishing ‚normal‛ and ‚abnormal‛ individuals and populations, but also for 
sanctioning intervention into both in order to ensure conformity or bring into 
conformity, to keep or make normal, and also to effectively eliminate the threat 
posed by resisting individuals and populations.   
Habermas construes the nature and function of the norm very differently 
than Foucault does.  Whereas for Foucault the norm founds and plays a key role in 
the functioning of modern power, for Habermas the norm demarcates the limits of 
power; it distinguishes what is good and valid from what is not, where goodness 
and validity are determined and legitimized not by relations of power but by reason.  
The basics of the Habermasian perspective are outlined in his book, Moral 
Consciousness and Communicative Action. 
Norms, according to Habermas, possess ‚ought character.‛19  ‚Norm-related 
speech acts,‛ he argues, make validity claims, in the sense that when one says ‚x is 
good to do‛ or ‚one ought to do x,‛ one is making a claim that x is morally 
justifiable; that is, one is saying that one has ‚good reasons‛ for doing x or that one 
‚ought to do‛ x.20  To be legitimate, the validity claims that normative speech acts 
make must be ‚general.‛  Habermas takes the position that general agreement or 
consensus about what constitutes moral and immoral action has to be able, at least in 
theory, to be reached in order for harms to be intelligible as ethical violations.  In the 
absence of some shared and communicable standard which harmful actions can be 
said to violate, such actions are not merely idiosyncratic but in fact incoherent.  The 
normativity of norms is thus interconnected with their intelligibility, making claims 
                                                 
19  Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian  
Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 44. 
20  Ibid. 
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of ‚normative rightness‛ different from claims of ‚propositional truth‛ and there-
fore in need of a different kind of justification.21   
On the one hand, the justification for norms needs to be relevant for lived 
experience.  Thus, while the ‚basic intuition‛ of Kant’s categorical imperative 
functions as a guide for Habermas, he rejects the notion that a single individual 
testing her or his maxims can sufficiently generate general validity.22  For Kant moral 
deliberation is ‚monological,‛ whereas for Habermas it is collective in the sense that 
it is grounded in and carried out by members of the lifeworld.23  Moreover, for 
Habermas moral deliberation aims to restore a moral consensus that has been 
disrupted and thus reflects a common as opposed to an individual will.24 
On the other hand, to be valid the justification for norms cannot simply be 
determined by the vicissitudes of human affairs.  It is for this reason that Habermas 
locates justification within the form – rather than in the content or outcome – of 
rational argumentation.  He refers to this form as ‚communicative action.‛  As 
opposed to strategic action, where one actor attempts to manipulate or coerce 
another in order to achieve personal satisfaction or gain, communicative action takes 
the form of rational argumentation aimed at consensus; it is characterized by the 
expectation that reasons can be provided for why certain norms should exist or not, 
and the communicative process itself entails persons providing such reasons.  As 
Habermas puts it, ‚one actor seeks rationally to motivate another by relying on the 
illocutionary binding/bonding effect of the offer [to make good on assertions by 
giving reasons] contained in the speech act.‛25   
The validity of norms is thus ‚guaranteed,‛ so to speak, by the fact that they 
are the products of a process that is rational as well as collective.  Habermas 
expresses this idea in what he refers to as the principle of universality (U), which 
states that for any valid norm, ‚*a]ll affected can accept the consequences and the 
side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of 
everyone’s interests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known 
alternative possibilities for regulation).‛26  As conceived by Habermas, the principle 
                                                 
21  Habermas argues that what he refers to as ‚non-cognitivist approaches‛ are insufficient  
for this purpose.  On the one hand, such approaches contend that general agreement 
cannot ‚ordinarily‛ be reached in ‚disputes about basic moral principles:‛ on the other 
hand, they assume the failure of ‚all attempts to explain what it might mean for 
normative propositions to be true.‛  In other words, because non-cognitivist approaches 
are unable to account for how normative speech acts differ from claims to propositional 
truth, such approaches cannot possibly provide the unique justification that normative 
speech acts require. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 56. 
22  Ibid., 64. 
23  Ibid., 67. 
24  Ibid. 
25  Ibid., 58; Habermas’s emphasis. 
26  Ibid., 65; Habermas’s emphasis. 
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of universality ‚makes agreement in moral argument possible in principle.‛27  This 
governing principle of rational discourse gains its justification from what Habermas 
refers to as ‚transcendental-pragmatic presuppositions.‛  These universal presuppo-
sitions are rules which are, Habermas argues, implicitly accepted by anyone who 
participates in practical discourse and which are in turn generated by or internal to 
that discourse itself; they are conditions for the possibility of rational argumentation 
as such.   
As James Tulley explains, there are two types of transcendental-pragmatic 
presuppositions: conventional and post-conventional.  Conventional presuppose-
tions ‚include logical-semantic rules of consistency . . . rules of mutual recognition 
among participants . . . and rules of reciprocity.‛28  Post-conventional presuppose-
tions include the following rules: ‚every subject with the competence to speak and 
act is allowed to take part in discourse (the principle of universal respect); everyone 
is allowed to question and introduce any assertion whatever and express his or her 
attitudes, desires, and needs (the principle of egalitarian reciprocity); and no speaker 
may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising these rights (the 
principles of non-coercion).‛29  It is as an expression of these transcendental-
pragmatic principles generally, but also, as Tulley points out, of the post-
conventional type more specifically, that the principle of universality can itself 
function as a kind of regulatory ideal for moral deliberation.  ‚Every person who 
accepts the universal and necessary communicative presuppositions of argument-
tative speech and who knows what it means to justify a norm of action,‛ Habermas 
writes, ‚implicitly presupposes as valid the principle of universalization, whether in 
the form I gave it or in an equivalent form.‛30  The principle of universality thus 
expresses the interconnection of intelligibility and normativity: intelligible moral 
deliberation, insofar as it is in fact intelligible, must necessarily possess certain 
normative foundations in the form of the transcendental-pragmatic presuppositions 
and the principle of universality (U).31 
The idea that not only the normative status but also the intelligibility of 
norms depends upon their ‚general acceptance‛ (i.e., their shared and 
communicable character) by participants in a common lifeworld attaches absolute 
and universal character – a certain ‚ineluctability,‛ as Habermas puts it – to norms 
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and normativity.  ‚We cannot,‛ Habermas writes, ‚retract at will our commitment to 
a lifeworld whose members we are.‛32  Citing Peter Strawson, Habermas 
acknowledges that participants in the lifeworld do have recourse, ‘‚as a refuge, aid, 
or out of simply curiosity,‛’ to a kind of third-person perspective which he refers to 
as the ‚objectivating attitude of the nonparticipant observer.‛33  Nevertheless, again 
invoking Strawson, Habermas argues that as human beings ‘‚we cannot, in the 
normal case‛’ maintain this objectivating attitude ‘‛for long or altogether.‛’34  
Subsequently, anyone who participates in practical discourse implicitly agrees to the 
rules (i.e., the transcendental pragmatic principles) which govern that discourse and 
thus, by extension, to (U).  As noted previously, Habermas contends that attempts to 
evade these rules render an actor incoherent or, more specifically and more 
troubling, ‚schizophrenic and suicidal.‛35 
It is the nature of this ineluctability that needs to be critically analyzed in 
light of normalization.  In Jürgen Habermas: A Philosophical-Political Profile, Martin 
Matuštík argues that the ineluctable character of Habermasian norms and 
normativity ought not to be viewed as absolutist or foundational, but rather as a 
kind of ‘‚groundless‛ performative holism.’36  ‚It is holism rather than 
foundationalism,‛ Matuštík writes, ‚since we always begin . . . in a context of a 
preinterpreted lifeworld.  This holism is performative (without grounds secured 
apart from speech or action), since we can never reach an absolutist point of view 
inside or outside history.‛37  I have found Matuštík’s analysis of Habermas’s work 
quite valuable, in large part because by situating that work within its sociopolitical 
context Matuštík elucidates the origins and nature of Habermas’s philosophical 
concerns.  Doing so he shows that it is neither dismissal nor lack of understanding 
but rather precisely those concerns themselves that cause Habermas to create and 
respond more to caricatures of thinkers like Foucault than to the thinkers 
themselves.38  Matuštík argues, rightly I think, that Habermas’s caricaturing of 
thinkers such as Foucault stems from his own fears about the nature of modern 
societies.  As I see it, these are fears that defining the parameters of rational 
discourse too broadly will allow for the emergence and proliferation of fascist 
discourse.  For Habermas, therefore, Foucault’s fear that defining such parameters 
too narrowly (and accepting a particular understanding of rational discourse to be 
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constitutive of rational discourse as such) will constrain the emergence of liberatory 
discourse (or at least pose a threat to the conditions under which such discourse 
might emerge) is not merely unfounded but potentially oppressive.   
Despite the value of Matuštík’s analysis in contextualizing and elucidating 
Habermas’s work, it nonetheless seems to me that he gives Habermas an overly 
generous reading on the point of ineluctability: it is difficult to see how asserting 
that the very intelligibility of normative truth claims requires the acceptance of 
certain principles is not absolutist.  And even if it is not, such an assertion is 
normalizing.  It demands uncritical acceptance of the norm and normativity as 
regulative ideals within ethical and political discourse, limits possible ways of 
critically analyzing prevailing approaches to ethics and politics and prevailing 
conceptualizations of ethical and political subjectivity and agency, and thereby links 
the increase of capacities (new modes of ethical and political thought and action) 
with the increase of power (some modes of thought and action are bracketed off 
from critique while others are simply prohibited).   
To illustrate this point more fully, let us take as an example the modern 
concept mentioned at the outset of this essay: sex.  Like the norm, sex is a 
characteristically modern concept that is perceived as natural and therefore beyond 
critical analysis.  Moreover, like the norm, it is also construed as necessary not 
merely for emancipation, but also functions as a means through which persons 
become intelligible at all.  While particular sexual norms generally possess 
normalizing potential, Foucault sees the norm of ‚sex‛ itself as particularly 
problematic in this regard because it is a key component in the creation, 
proliferation, and establishment of sexual norms within society (‚the deployment of 
sexuality‛); oppression may stem not only from particular constructions of sexuality 
in terms of, for example, the ‚normal‛ and the ‚abnormal,‛ but also and perhaps 
most importantly from the uncritical acceptance of the norm of sex as a ‚natural‛ 
and necessary foundation upon which individual sexualities and subjectivities are 
based.39  The concept of sex, for Foucault, functions as a mode of legitimation for and 
delimits the boundaries of sexuality – it renders us intelligible to ourselves and to 
one another – and, as such, it is in particular need of critical interrogation: ‚it is 
precisely the idea of sex in itself that we cannot accept without examination,‛ he 
argues.40  Moreover, insofar as sex is seen as fundamental to who one is, generating 
and obtaining knowledge about sexuality is synonymous with having access to 
truth.  The interconnection of sex and truth, in turn, encourages the acceptance and 
internalization of sexual norms and thus masks their normalizing character: persons 
perceive the proliferation of sexual identities and discourses as signifying freedom 
from sexual repression when in fact it situates subjects squarely within in relations 
                                                 
39  See Foucault’s discussion of the deployment of sexuality in Volume I o f The History of 
 Sexuality (New York: Vintage, 1990). 
40  Ibid., 154; Foucault’s emphasis. 
Taylor: Normativity and Normalization 
58 
 
of power.  ‚We must not,‛ Foucault argues, ‚think that by saying yes to sex one says 
no to power.‛41   
I am suggesting that the demand for normative criteria functions as a mode 
of legitimation for and thus delimits the boundaries of ethical and political 
philosophical discourse.  Just as ‚sex‛ simultaneously renders subjects intelligible as 
sexual subjects and circumscribes the forms sexual subjectivity may take, so does 
this demand simultaneously function as a condition for the possibility of ethics and 
politics and circumscribe ethical and political forms and discourse.  For Habermas, 
ethical and political discourse accepts and therefore validates the principle of 
universality and the transcendental-pragmatic presuppositions; likewise, ethical and 
political subjects assume and act in accordance with both.  What must be assumed 
for the purposes of coherent, rational argumentation about ethical and political 
norms cannot itself be open to such argumentation.  Insofar as this is the case, (U) 
and the transcendental-pragmatic presuppositions come to be seen as necessary and, 
over time, natural and therefore inevitable.  To question them, as I have done here, 
thus appears to be not merely ethically and politically irrelevant or dangerous but 
nonsensical.  Naturalizing (U) and the presuppositions and characterizing 
challenges to their necessity as incoherent (not to mention schizophrenic) effectively 
inhibits different kinds of ethical and political thinking to the point that different 
ways of thinking come to be seen as simply impossible.  Persons become adept at 
conceptualizing ethics and politics in ways that assume the necessity of certain 
‚normative foundations,‛ but lack the ability not only to imagine what ethics and 
politics might look like outside of such a framework, but also to see the framework 
for what it is – a particular and limited product of prevailing modes of thought and 
existence – and therefore to critically reflect upon and expand beyond it.   
 At this point it is important to reiterate that Foucault does not emphasize the 
significance of ‚thinking differently,‛ as he puts it, for its own sake.42  As stated at 
the outset of this essay, from a Foucauldian perspective refusing to uncritically 
accept what is presented to us as natural and therefore necessary is tied to the 
practice of freedom.  Normalizing norms are potentially oppressive because, while 
they do in fact increase persons’ capacities, such an increase is achieved at the 
expense of other possible modes of thinking and acting.  Limiting of possibilities, for 
Foucault, both curtails the flow of power throughout society and hinders persons’ 
ability to negotiate current power relations.  Insofar as Foucault sees freedom being 
characterized not by an escape from power but rather by the ability to negotiate 
power relations in ways that increase capacities and possible modes of thought and 
existence, for him such curtailment has the potential to lead to states of domination 
in which all aspects of persons’ lives are dictated to them.   
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From a Foucauldian perspective, therefore, Habermas’s insistence on the 
necessity of normative foundations for intelligible and emancipatory ethical and 
political discourse runs the risk of rearticulating the same kinds of harms he wants 
to mitigate through this insistence.  But for Foucault, this does not mean that 
Habermas’s work must be rejected.  And herein, as I see it, lies a really important 
and fundamental difference between Foucault and Habermas.  Foucault recognizes 
his own perspective as a perspective; it is historically, socially, and politically bound, 
and he leaves it up to his readers to determine for themselves the value of the tools 
he offers for mediating against domination and promoting freedom – to subject 
those tools to the ‚test of . . . contemporary reality.‛43  For Habermas, on the other 
hand, such testing is possible only up to a point: there are certain ‚ineluctable‛ 
aspects of human existence that have to be accepted in order to make sense of the 
world and insure some sort of conditions for the possibility of freedom.  This 
requirement of uncritical acceptance means, by extension, that there are certain 
questions that cannot be asked, certain modes of thought and existence that are not 
valid, and certain modes of critical engagement that cannot be allowed.  Both 
Foucault and Habermas are concerned with such conditions, but where Habermas 
seeks to identify and preserve them, Foucault argues that they need to be constantly 
critically analyzed and recreated.  For Habermas, some certainty about the world – 
even if only a tiny sliver – is possible.  For Foucault, not only is certainty impossible, 
our desire for it is shaped by modern modes of thought that are interconnected with 
a drive for control and domination; as such, not only certainty but the desire for it 
needs to be critically analyzed and resisted.  In sum, with Foucault we do not get 
certainty.  With Habermas we do not get it, either; the problem is that we do get the 
empty belief that we can have it, a belief that encourages us to search for certainty 
rather than to find effective ways of resisting domination and promoting freedom 
within a world without it.  The annals of modern history – particularly the twentieth 
and, thus far, the twenty-first centuries – illustrate the degree to which harm can 
result from, as William Connolly puts it, the ‚systematic cruelty‛ that ‚flows 
regularly from the thoughtlessness of aggressive conventionality.‛44  While 
Habermas in no way engages in or promotes such thoughtlessness, I think he 
maintains a kernel of a mode of thought that, under the right conditions, has the 
potential to develop into it.  Insofar as this is the case, I suggest, paraphrasing 
Foucault, that ‚it is precisely the demand for uncritical acceptance – including of the 
norm and normativity – in itself that we cannot accept without examination.‛   
Habermas’s primary criticism of Foucault is that he engages in performative 
contradictions which throw him back upon a kind of ‚crypto-normativity‛ that 
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involves relying upon the same concepts he critiques.  From the perspective of 
Habermas, Foucault cannot simultaneously invoke a norm (freedom, for example) 
while simultaneously critiquing the very idea of the norm by illustrating its 
implication in relations of power.  As I have argued here, however, Habermas’s 
perspective holds only if his own conceptualization of the norm and normativity are 
accepted as the necessary framework through which any appeal to values such 
freedom can take place.  Foucault’s illustration of the implication of the norm in 
relations of power does not irrevocably taint the idea of the norm, but it does mean 
that all norms have the potential to be normalizing, and that persons have to be 
vigilant in their critical analysis of prevailing modes of thought and existence.  All 
norms implicate us in relations of power, but whereas some are normalizing and 
promote power at the expense of freedom, others mitigate power and promote 
freedom.  Norms that function in a normalizing manner under prevailing conditions 
may not always be normalizing, and those which promote freedom within a 
particular sociohistorical context may not always do so.  Again, it is up to persons to 
be engaged enough in the world to be able to ‚separate out, from the contingency 
that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking 
what are, do, or think . . . to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, 
and to determine the precise form this change should take.‛45  By way of conclusion, 
I would like to examine three values, considered by Foucault to be useful tools in the 
kind of separating, grasping, and determining described above, which I believe are 
valuable for the practice of western philosophy. 
For Foucault, values and principles are not grounds but rather effects of 
critical engagement with the present.  While values and principles might be 
translated into strategies, these would really only be meaningful within the context 
of the present from which they spring.  The notion of ‚strategy‛ here needs to be 
construed in terms of what Foucault refers to as ‚problematization,‛ the 
‚development of a domain of acts, practices, and thoughts that pose problems for‛ 
prevailing – one could say normative – modes of existence.46  I’ve suggested that 
Foucault’s refusal to comply with prevailing modes of thought and existence stems 
from his recognition of the normalizing potential of norms, including the demand 
for normative criteria itself; as such, it reflects a deep concern with promoting 
freedom.  And I think, moreover, that Foucault’s conceptualization of values and 
principles as effects of critical engagement with the present goes a long way toward 
explaining his articulation of ethics in terms of an ethos or ‚a way of life.‛  In a late 
interview, an interlocutor asks Foucault if he is a ‚nihilist who reject*s+ morality.‛47  
After responding with an emphatic, ‚No!,‛ Foucault proceeds to articulate what he 
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refers to as the three ‚moral values‛ which he practices and ‚within which *he 
situates his] work.‛48  The first value is refusal – specifically, refusing ‚to accept as 
self-evident the things that are proposed to us.‛49  As I have argued here, if persons 
uncritically accept what is presented to them as natural and necessary they are 
unlikely to recognize harmful (i.e., normalizing) effects stemming from prevailing 
modes of thought and existence and, therefore, to be in a position to do anything 
about such effects.  So refusal is crucial in creating conditions under which making 
change is possible.  The second value Foucault identifies is curiosity: ‚the need to 
analyze and to know, since we can accomplish nothing without reflection and 
knowledge.‛50  Once refusal opens all aspects of existence to critical analysis, persons 
need to undertake that analysis.  Foucault makes clear that it is only through critical 
engagement with our own historical actualities that we can identify harmful 
practices, work to end or alter them, and endeavor to proceed along different lines.  
Refusal and curiosity pave the way for the third value he identifies, innovation: ‚to 
seek out in our reflection those things that have never been thought or imagined.‛51   
These three values can be seen to inform and in turn be rearticulated through 
what Foucault refers to as a ‚politics of ourselves.‛52  From a Foucauldian 
perspective, practicing refusal, curiosity, and innovation can facilitate a loosening of 
the interconnection between increasing persons’ capacities and possibilities and 
intensifying power.  While activities that are considered political in a traditional 
sense – such as a protest, campaign, or voter registration drive – could certainly 
entail refusal, curiosity, and innovation, the ‚politics‛ Foucault refers to is not 
limited to this type of activity; persons can cultivate the kind of critical stance 
reflected in the values of refusal, curiosity, and innovation in a variety of ways.53  
Insofar as this is the case, I think that engaging in a politics of ourselves needs to be 
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understood as cultivating what Foucault variously refers to as a way of life, an ethos, 
and an attitude – a particular way of constituting and conducting ourselves as 
subjects that both informs and is reflected in what we do.54  Moreover, given its three 
key aspects this ethos or attitude needs to be understood more specifically as 
‚critical‛ in a Foucauldian sense, where persons recognize limits but refuse to accept 
them as absolute, natural, and necessary.  As Judith Butler puts it, ‚critique will be 
that perspective on established and ordering ways of knowing which is not 
immediately assimilated into that ordering function.‛55 
Philosophical activity may be a means by which to cultivate a critical attitude, 
but only if it contains a ‚political dimension.‛56  That is to say, philosophy is critical 
to the extent that it concerns itself with ‚what we are willing to accept in our worlds, 
to refuse, and to change, both in ourselves and in our circumstances.‛57  Through the 
practice of philosophy, persons can conduct historical analyses of how things have 
to come to be the way that they are – can conduct what Foucault calls ‚ontologies of 
the present‛ – and through such analyses identify how things might be different and 
work toward making them so.  Foucault makes this point in a different way in the 
Introduction to Volume II of The History of Sexuality when he describes what he 
believes to be the role of philosophy within contemporary society: 
 
There are times in life when the question of knowing if one can think differently 
than one thinks, and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely necessary if 
one is to go on looking and reflecting at all . . . [W]hat is philosophy today . . . in 
what does it consist, if not in the endeavor to know how and to what extent it 
might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is already 
known?58 
 
Foucault is here describing a mode of philosophical engagement that does not seek 
to substitute existing, positive ideas for harmful ones or to uncritically assert 
prevailing concepts, standards, and principles that are no longer relevant for 
contemporary reality.  He is not interested in, in other words, ‚a critical philosophy 
that seeks to determine the conditions and the limits of our possible knowledge of 
the object.‛59  Instead, he engages in and in turn endeavors to foster ‚a critical 
philosophy that seeks the conditions and the indefinite possibilities of transforming 
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the subject, of transforming ourselves‛60 and, therefore, of transforming the world in 
which we live.  This is a philosophy grounded in critical reflection on and engage-
ment with the present (with how the present has come to acquire its particular 
character) which aims at promoting freedom or at the very least at (re)creating the 
conditions for its possibility.  Such critical reflection and engagement involves 
identifying normalizing practices, analyzing their effects, and developing new, non-
normalizing modes of thought and existence.  Possibilities for change lie neither in 
despairing in the face of nor trying to gloss over the complexities of modern 
societies, but rather precisely in acknowledging and engaging the depths of such 
complexities which shape but do not determine the nature of such acknowledgment 
and engagement. 
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